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Judgment at The Hague 
Ruti Teitel 
When the first international war crimes trial in 
half a century opened in May 1996 at The Hague, 
it was justice in a vacuum-first it was justice com-
pletely isolated from the raging conflict on the 
ground in war-torn Yugoslavia, and, later, justice 
poised on a precarious peace, a delicate balance. It 
was justice in a vacuum almost literally, for the 
entire courtroom was wrapped in bulletproof 
glass, as if to protect the fragile legal processes 
from a violent threat. In other notorious war 
crimes trials, such as the trial of Adolf Eichmann, 
it was the perpetrator who was separated by glass. 
At The Hague, not only the accused, but the 
entire proceeding stands separated, as if vulnera-
ble in its search for a rule of law in extraordinary 
circumstances. What is law's potential in an isola-
tion booth? What is the role for trials during 
wartime and in a fragile peace? 
Though there are similarities between 
Nuremberg and the Hague Tribunal, the differ-
ences are profound. Most prominent is the order 
of events-trials, then peace. The WWII trials 
sought justice after peace, punishing Germany 
and Japan's crimes after the war had ended. But 
the Hague Tribunal began while the bloody war 
still raged. Its hope was that bringing individuals 
responsible for war crimes to justice would also 
bring about a peace. Thus while Nuremberg 
sought justice after peace, The Hague seeks peace 
through justice. 
This is something new, and it raises profound 
questions for international law. What is the con-
nection between justice and peace? The Tribunal at 
The Hague has little more than hope to off er here, 
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but in a form that offers something new for 
international law in unsettled times. 
Evidence and individual responsibility 
The nature and purposes of the Tribunal's justice 
leads back to its origins in the Balkan conflict. In the 
spring of 1992, Bosnian Serbs, with the assistance of 
the Yugoslav army, began a drive to ''ethnically 
cleanse" all non-Serb inhabitants from broad swaths 
of Bosnia. After three years, employing siege warfare 
tactics, widespread systematic persecution, torture, 
murder, rape, beatings, harassments, discrimination, 
and displacement, the Bosnian Serbs virtually com-
pleted their task-"cleansing" eastern Bosnia, leaving 
a quarter of a million dead, tens of thousands of 
refugees, and thousands of victims of civilian torture. 
After the television cameras caught up with the 
massacre, the UN Security Council was forced to 
act. At first there were warnings that the warring 
parties must comply with international humanitar-
ian law. When that failed, the Security Council 
established a commission, modeled on the 1943 
Allied War Crimes Commission, to investigate the 
atrocities committed in the region. By February 
1993, the "Commission of Experts" had concluded 
that there had been willful killing, organized mas-
sacres, torture, rape, pillage, and destruction of 
civilian property-all in a campaign to render "an 
area ethnically homogeneous, using force and 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups 
from the area." (See UN Doc. S/25274.) In eastern 
Bosnia, the tactics were plainly war crimes, "grave 
breaches" of the laws of war governing internation-
al conflict, as well as "crimes against humanity" as 
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defined at the Nuremberg trials and by internation-
al law. Ethnic cleansing was part of a much larger 
attempt by Bosnian Serb forces to commit genocide 
against Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs (see 
UN Doc. S/26274). On May 25, 1993, the Security 
Council, operating under its Chapter VII powers, 
established the "International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia" as ''a measure to main-
tain or restore international peace and security." 
Bringing individuals to justice, the Security Council 
said, would contribute to the restoration and main-
tenance of the peace. 
But how? The Tribunal faced practical as well 
as conceptual problems. Unlike Nuremberg, the 
Tribunal lacked the power that comes with tradi-
tional victor's justice. Thus it was unable to gain cus-
tody of the accused, and incapable of gaining access 
to evidence. The Dayton accords did not help. 
Though the accords obligated the signatories to sup-
port the Tribunal (Arts. IX and X), and hand over 
suspected war criminals, they lacked explicit 
enforcement mechanisms. There was no mention 
of whose responsibility it was to arrest indicted war 
criminals. These powers were said to lie outside the 
mandate of the NATO peace implementation force 
(IFOR). And thus despite persistent calls for the 
arrests of Serbian leaders Radovan Karadzic and 
Ratko Mladic, IFOR, even when in their proximity, 
seemingly did their best to avoid confrontation. 
This inaction only underscored the growing 
gap between the Tribunal's objective and the UN's 
failure of support. And as time has passed, this 
impotence has become more pronounced. In a 
speech to the UN General Assembly, on November 
7, 1995, Tribunal presidingjudge Antonio Cassese 
compared the Tribunal to "a giant who has no arms 
and no legs. To walk and work, he needs artificial 
limbs. These artificial limbs are the state authorities; 
without their help the Tribunal can not operate." 
Like Gulliver amongst the Lilliputians, the 
Tribunal is paralyzed by the inaction of the interna-
tional community, until they see fit to support the 
Tribunal's efforts to accomplish its mission. 
But it was also unclear how, even with the appro-
priate support, such a Tribunal was to work-in par-
ticular, how justice was to advance peace. One pur-
pose for holding war crimes trials during the conflict 
was said to be deterrence. Like the French trials of 
German soldiers during WWI, or the Allies threats 
of punishment during WWII, the idea was that trials 
might deter the commission of further atrocities. But 
they did not. Massacres committed well after the 
Tribunal's establishment make plain ·the irrelevance 
of the trials to the military conduct on the ground. 
Beyond deterrence, there were other more 
ambitious hopes. Individual accountability was 
thought to be a way to break a cycle of ethnic retri-
bution. "Absolving nations of collective guilt 
through the attribution of individual responsibili-
ty is an essential means of countering the misinfor-
mation and indoctrination which breeds ethnic 
and religious hatred." (See Prosecuter's Response 
to the Defense Motions filed on June 23, 1995, 
Dusko Tadic case No. IT-94-IT.) This reasoning 
hearkened back to a traditional purpose of the 
criminal law-the control of private vengeance by 
formally attributing responsibility. In this way, 
war crimes trials were to enable the move from 
ethnic conflict to peace and reconciliation, by 
treating the collective wrongs of the warring fac-
tions as individual wrongs. 
The focus was on ethnic cleansing. Reaffirming 
Nuremberg's central principle that responsibility for 
war crimes was individual, the Tribunal prosecuted 
ethnic cleaning as crimes against humanity (as "inhu-
mane acts" that are '~despread and systematic," "per-
petrated on any civilian population, on an ethnic 
basis") and as genocide against individuals through-
out the chain of command. The massacres were 
undeniable, but the legal standard of proof for each 
charge would be severe: Genocide required proof of 
specific intent of racial, religious, or ethnic persecu-
tion. By the spring of 1992, the Commission of 
Experts's final report had concluded that mass mur-
der, torture, and rape, committed in the area of 
Opstina Prijedor in north-western Bosnia against 
civilians both inside and outside of detention camps, 
unquestionably constituted crimes against humani-
ty, and that a court of law would find it to be geno-
cide. Genocidal intent to destroy ethnic and religious 
groups was also present in the distinctive patterns of 
Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing, widespread mas-
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sacres, and systematic rapes. In the words of the 
Tribunal, July 1995, "the Muslim population of the 
enclave ofSrebrenica [a UN "safe area"] was virtual-
ly eliminated by Bosnian Serb Military personnel .. 
. under the command and control of Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic." In its indictments of 
these Serbian leaders, the Tribunal concluded there 
was prima face evidence that the facts "disclose 
above all, the commission of genocide." But locating 
that collective intent in the minds of individual 
actors would be a different matter; and so too its 
effectiveness in ending the ethnic conflict. 
From Superindictments to truth 
The Tribunal's conception of what is criminal in 
the Balkans is also a significant move away from 
established legal views. While traditionally, victori-
ous powers punished crimes committed in the 
course of a war, The Hague condemns another 
injustice, not necessarily tied to international con-
flict. The Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to crimes 
against humanity committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or not. Ethnic persecution, 
even that occurring wholly within a state, is prose-
cuted as an "international" war crime. As it departs 
from the traditional paradigm, the Tribunal exem-
plifies a new understanding of accountability that 
makes heinous and systematic rights violations an 
international matter. 
This is something new. Prosecuting ethnic per-
secution is the mirror image of the traditional case: 
the shift is from judging the wrongs committed by 
foreign invaders or occupiers against civilians to 
judging the abuses that states commit against their 
own citizens. For victims of ethnic persecution are 
citizens who have been rendered aliens within their 
own homeland. They have neither a state, nor 
courts, nor law to protect them. The International 
Tribunal now takes their side. This decision illus-
trates the potential of an expansive practice of 
international humanitarian law: A state's persecu-
tion of its citizens need not be confined within 
national boundaries, but transcends to the interna-
tional sphere. 
But this humanitarian project, though ambi-
tious, is again utterly frustrated by the constraints 
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of a cold peace. Most of those responsible for war 
crimes remain at large. Seated in the Netherlands, 
remote from the scene of the crimes, most of the 
evidence necessary to establish individual wrong-
doing is in effect at large as well. Operating within 
these constraints, the Tribunal's justice has been 
non-traditional as well. In the main, its work has 
been limited to the process of indictment. And 
while at Nuremberg some of those indicted (such 
as Martin Bormann) were tried and convicted in 
absentia, such was not to be the case at The Hague. 
The inability to gather defendants or evidence 
raised the fear that trials in absentia would become 
the norm and so, under Tribunal rules, they are 
strictly forbidden. Thus as the Serbian leadership 
continues to evade responsibility, the Tribunal has 
persevered with its indictments, an utterly 
Balkanized legal process, split off from political 
reality in the region. 
The indictments appear to have their own pur-
pose, unrelated to the eventual conviction of 
any individual. Tribunal indictments, so-called 
superindictments, are now an elaborate public pro-
ceeding, a recitation of offenses and presentation of 
the evidence. Like American grand juries, the pro-
ceedings marshal all the evidence, and seem fairer 
than trials in absentia, since in the accused's absence, 
there is no judgment. The "superindictments" are 
public and even televised with live witness testimony. 
(In the US, Court TV covered two such spectacles 
"live.") And with seventy-five pending indictments, 
and only five suspects in custody, we can expect 
more of these public recitatives. 
The superindictment proceedings have become 
substitutes for trials. In a sense, they are "show tri-
als," not because their results are rigged, but because 
their main purpose is to tell a story. Their function 
is expressive. Through these public indictment pro-
ceedings, the Tribunal establishes and condemns 
wrongdoing. Following indictments, an interna-
tional warrant of arrest is issued, the evidence pub-
lished, and the accused publicly branded as an 
international fugitive from justice. These 
superindictments and their stigmatization is the 
Tribunal's first sanction, though lack of political 
support may make them its only sanction as well. 
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By pursuing the truth about atrocities in the 
region, the Tribunal returns to an old understanding 
of "prosecution," signifying the investigation of the 
truth of a contested event. Indeed, the UN Court 
has been described as an exercise in "truthtelling." 
According to the Clinton Administration's John 
Shattuck, ''establishing the truth about what hap-
pened in Bosnia and Croatia is essential not just to 
justice, but to peace." Truth, too, becomes the tool of 
peace, following the view of some that establishing 
the "truth" about a state's repressive past can lay the 
foundation for national reconciliation. National 
truth commissions, in Argentina, Chile, and most 
recently South Africa, have been touted as critical 
features of successful political transition. The 
promise of just such a reconciliation in the Balkans 
was symbolized by the appointment, as the 
Tribunal's chief prosecutor, of Richard Goldstone, 
known for his leadership in South Africa's peaceful 
transition from apartheid. Indeed, at the first 
superindictment proceeding, on October 9, 1995, 
Goldstone likened the public indictments to the 
national truth commissions, declaring the "public 
record will assist in attributing guilt to individuals 
and be an important tool in avoiding the attribution 
of collective guilt to any nation or ethnic group." 
Yet again, the traditional pattern is reversed. 
Just as war crimes trials have traditionally followed 
peace, not preceded it, so too in countries where 
truth commissions have been convened, it was not 
"truth" that brought on the peace, but rather peace 
that enabled the search for truth. Once again, a tra-
ditional end, in Bosnia, has become a political 
means. While truth, like justice, has formerly been 
the fruit of peace, in Bosnia, both are now pursued 
for their promise of peace. 
There are questions about this strategy. It is 
also not clear how the criminal process advances 
truth. In one sense, of course, it does by enabling 
formal documentation, adhering to very high stan-
dards of past wrongdoing. Yet criminal proceed-
ings aim primarily not at establishing the truth of 
a contested event; rather, their objective is to 
ascribe individual responsibility for past wrongdo-
ing, and then to pass judgment. Indeed there is a 
tension between this idea of truth through crimi-
nal prosecution and truth as a means of justice. For 
individuals should not be prosecuted simply as a 
means to establish the truth. An indictment is not 
a conviction and justice demands that the pre-
sumption of innocence ought be maintained. 
Though the criminal process may well establish 
some sense of truth about individual wrongdoing, 
it is for this reason precisely that it is not well suit-
ed to a working through of a region's conflictual 
history. Historical inquiry requires a broader lens 
than that of the individual trial. And if truth were 
the UN's goal, then the better course might well 
have been to continue the historical mission of the 
Commission of Experts in 1993. 
Neutrality's justice 
But a more profound concern is raised by the 
nature of the story told by the Tribunal. Through 
exemplary justice, and the juxtaposition of atroci-
ties, Serb, Croat, and Muslim perpetrators, and vic-
tims, all line up. The story is of an ancient and 
intractable ethnic enmity; the conflict made to 
seem natural and inevitable. All sides are guilty. 
Implicitly, the Tribunal thereby offers the West a 
justification for its nonintervention, suggesting a 
haunting connection between justice and peace. 
Traditionally, war crimes trials tell a story that 
rationalizes the victor's military policy, and more 
importantly, the victor's military intervention. But 
the Hague Tribunal makes the case for another sort 
of military policy-nonintervention. The lesson of 
this Tribunal is of eternal atrocities, of justice with-
out victors and without heroes, instead of a cycle of 
perpetrators and victims. In this account, interna-
tional criminal law rises above harsh political and 
military realities, to portray a strange deracinated 
victim's justice. In its landmark decision regarding 
its jurisdiction under the UN's Charter, the 
Tribunal justified its dominion over the crimes at 
issue by asserting that these "cannot be considered 
political offenses, as they do not harm a political 
interest of a particular state," and the "norms pro-
hibiting them have a universal character." The 
Tribunal advances this normative function, con-
demning ethnic persecution as a profound offense 
against the entire international community, but 
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from a perspective detached from the struggle. 
For both in wartime and in peace, here was a 
Tribunal presided over by nonvictors and neutrals. 
Within the international human rights community, 
this neutrality is thought to render the trials at The 
Hague superior to prior war crimes trials. And no 
doubt there is an undeniable, even if misguided, 
appeal to the idea of neutrality in the midst of hos-
tilities, that avoids the partiality of victor's justice. 
But this does not leave the Tribunal with clean 
hands. For though the Tribunal may appear imper-
vious to the challenges traditionally leveled against 
victor's justice, this does not mean there are no ques-
tion of justice to be raised against the UN in this 
conflict. The UN's role raises grave questions of 
moral responsibility, and therefore by association, it 
raises questions about the Tribunal's authority. 
Victor's justice is at its most vulnerable when those 
sitting in judgment have unclean hands. The. "tu 
quoque" challenge was raised loudly at Nuremberg 
because of the Soviet judges. Yet here, noninterven-
tion does not leave the UN innocent. Rather, it is its 
failure to intervene that is questionable. For it was 
the UN's own creation of the safe havens that drew 
Muslims and Croats into the concentrated enclaves, 
and these enclaves facilitated part of the genocide 
that the Tribunal now adjudicates. 
This is crime by omission. Post-Nuremberg, 
crimes by omission, especially by those charged 
with political responsibility over a geographic 
region, raise profound questions of international 
criminal responsibility. Hence, exactly one year 
after the Srebrenica "safe area" massacres, the UN 
has a deep interest in holding public indictment prcr 
ceedings to assign responsibility to others-to 
Serbian leaders Karadzic and Mladic, in particular. 
And their absence from the courtroom, as well as 
NATO's unconcern about their arrest, affirms a 
craven international neutrality. 
Internationalizing justice 
The liberal hope was that, despite hostilities, this 
exercise of rule of law in a political vacuum would 
somehow triumph. Yet with the UN's dirty hands, 
and the perpetual unearthing of mass graves in the 
region, the constructions of "international law," of 
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"universality," of "crimes against humanity," of 
"genocide," even as they attempt to rise above the 
political, do not succeed in pushing aside haunting 
questions about the meaning of the judicial 
response to ongoing persecution. What is the point 
of justice, always after the fact? What is the hope of 
justice, before any peace? 
In these political circumstances, the Tribunal's 
project is necessarily more limited than that of tra-
ditional criminal justice. Yet the Tribunal's justice 
does have a point. Its aim is transitional, character-
istic of a more general phenomena that we might 
call "transitional justice." The role of the Tribunal 
is to insure some measure of accountability during 
extraordinary periods oflawlessness. International 
criminal justice is justified by the failings of 
national justice to respond to ethnic persecution. 
Thus, international crimes against humanity juris-
diction transcends national borders because of the 
distinctive nature of ethnic persecution and geno-
cide. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, perse-
cution on the basis of ethnicity triggers extraordi-
nary extensions of international criminal jurisdic-
tion. In Croatia, there have been thousands of tri-
als involving members of the opposing forces held 
in absentia. In Rwanda, tens of thousands of Hutus 
were held in prolonged detention, yet not one 
national trial has been held. In such extraordinary 
contexts, internationalization of justice offers a 
way out for victims of persecution. Yet, for the 
same reason, when the rule of law is restored, 
indictments should be turned over to the affected 
states. Ultimately, the message of ethnic reconcili-
ation is best enforced by pluralistic states commit-
ted to liberal principles of dignity and equal regard 
under the law. But in the meantime, the aim of 
international criminal jurisdiction must be to aid 
in that transition. 
In the international human rights community, 
some believe that the Tribunal brings us a step clos-
er to a permanent international criminal court. 
The Hague precedent suggests that even those 
opposing a permanent international criminal court 
might well support an international criminal court 
along the lines of the Tribunal-a Court that would 
prosecute only the most grave offenses, to fill in 
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where national systems of justice have failed. They 
might support, that is, an international tribunal juris-
diction that is explicitly transitional and, rather than 
imposingjustice claims on outlaw nations, is aimed at 
moving a nation towards the conditions within 
which its can adjudicate justice claims applying the 
rule of law. 
For those in the Bosnia slaughterhouse, justice 
alone cannot bring peace. Nor is the Tribunal's 
practice of justice ideal. Nevertheless, ultimately, 
the Tribunal's carefully drawn indictments of per-
secution should be supported, if understood as 
bounded and contingent transitional justice, delin-
eating a thin line of international law, that might 
transcend the brutality of local power. 
Ruti Teitel is Senior Schell Fellow at Yale Law School and 
Professor of Law at New York Law School Her forthcom-
ing book, Transitional Justice, will be published by 
Oxford Press, 1997. 
The War Crimes Tribunal in the Yugoslav Context 
Vojin Dimitrijevic 
My daddy is 
a criminal of war. 
Just try hard 
to sentence him. 
No one has the[. .. ] 
to take him to court. 
Popular folk song during the war in 
Bosnia by Baja Mali Knindza 
Very popular in 1992 and early 1993, this ditty 
echoed the mood of many Serbs, not only in 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, but also among the 
Serb diaspora in the US and other Western coun-
tries. Crudely bellicose sentiments were enkin-
dled by the media in Serbia and Montenegro, and 
by an influential part of the intellectual establish-
ment in Belgrade and other cultural centers. A 
description of all the ingredients of this mood 
would lead me far from the subject of this sympo-
sium. But the underlying psychological posture 
can be summarized as follows. Serbs have for cen-
turies been the victims of genocide, injustice, and 
oppression, especially in WWII when they suf-
fered more than anyone else at the hands of their 
Slav "brothers" in Yugoslavia. Earlier Serb efforts 
to accommodate and use peaceful means to 
resolve disputes have been futile and naive, leav-
ing war as the only solution to the "Serb ques-
tion." The second part of this bracing world view 
is that the ongoing holy war is a war for the cre-
ation of a state, that it, a war for survival, a war 
against arch-foes, where mercy and sentiment are 
out of place, even toward one's conationals. In this 
kind of war, there are no rules. It is a holy mission, 
where individuals are of no concern, neither as 
victims nor as perpetrators. 
Serbs found it sublimely simple to adopt this 
"macho" demeanor when they seemed militarily 
victorious, as many observers, at home and abroad, 
saw them to be towards the end of 1992. At that 
stage in the hostilities, foreign powers (Europe and 
the US) displayed anything but resolute resistance 
to Serb military advances and "foreigners" were dis-
missed as weak and indecisive by most Serb leaders. 
This Serb perception is partly explained by the fact 
that the Serb leadership was made up mostly of for-
mer Communist officials and officers of the 
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